Experience vs. Connections: What’s More Important for Getting Ahead in the CCP?

How much do career tracks and patronage networks matter for those that reach the highest echelons of power within the Chinese Communist Party?

INSIGHTS

• Researchers classify the career tracks of 1,600 Central Committee members between 1982 and 2017 according to position rank and experience across bureaucratic domains (local government, central government, party apparatus, and the People’s Liberation Army). 

• Those launching careers at higher ranks and more frequently moving across bureaucratic domains were likelier to reach the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of CCP power. 

• Those with experience in the party apparatus (rather than other bureaucratic domains), princeling status, and connections to higher officials were likelier to secure advantageous career tracks.

• Connections with Party Secretary Xi Jinping matter much more after the 19th Party Congress (2017), but do not entirely outweigh career tracks in predicting career success.

Source Publication: Ruixue Jia and Yiqing Xu (2018). “Rotating to the Top: How Career Tracks Matter in the Chinese Communist Party.” Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working paper.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has roughly 100 million members. At the apex of the party hierarchy are the Central Committee (just shy of 400 members, including alternates), the Politburo (currently 25 members, including alternates) and the Politburo Standing Committee (currently 7 members, chaired by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping), in ascending order of political power. How do officials accede to these uppermost echelons of power in China? Are there particular career tracks that position officials favorably? What personal characteristics and patronage networks matter? Have the factors that predict an official’s rise changed during the Xi Jinping era?  

The data. Researchers study the career tracks of 1,598 Central Committee members from the 12th through the 19th Party Congress (1982–2017) using detailed information on career information primarily compiled by Shih, Adolph, and Liu (2012). In addition to career track details, data include individual characteristics such as birth place, gender, ethnicity, education, and family background.  

Classifying career tracks across China’s bureaucratic hierarchy. Researchers used a machine learning algorithm to establish a “position rank” hierarchy of career positions held by the 12th to 19th Central Committee members (including alternates) based on when the positions were held during an official’s career. Positions held later in one’s career are considered higher ranked than those held earlier. They then classify the officials into three groups according to the job they had in this hierarchy early in their career (ages 35–37): those starting with a high-level position (high starters), a medium-level position (medium starters), or a low-level position (low starters). 

Researchers then calculate the “job diversity” of each committee member across the four major bureaucratic domains of the CCP: the local government (e.g., provincial, prefectural, county government), the central government (e.g., ministries, State Council), the party apparatus (e.g., Party Secretariat, Organization Department, United Front), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They then classify them into three groups according to how frequently they rotate across domains: frequent movers, occasional movers, and non-movers. 

The structure of China’s political system 

High starters, frequent movers more likely to reach top of political hierarchy. The researchers find that high starters and frequent movers are more likely to enter the Central Committee and the Politburo. For instance, a high starter’s probability of entering the Central Committee is about 14% higher than a low starter. Meanwhile, 14% of the high starters are Politburo (including Politburo Standing Committee) members, while the number for medium and low starters are only 3% and 6%. Likewise, a frequent mover’s probability of entering the Central Committee is 18% higher than a non-mover. A frequent mover’s probability of entering the Politburo is 9.1 percentage points higher than that of a non-mover, which represents a 130% increase from the baseline probability. These findings suggest that high starter, frequent mover career tracks are among the most advantageous.  

Personal networks, bureaucratic domain predict high starters, frequent movers. Before the 19th Party Congress, princelings (descendants of prominent revolutionary leaders), those who were in leadership positions of the Communist Youth League, and those with connections to the Party General Secretary (i.e., they served under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, or Xi Jinping in the same provincial government, the same central government ministry or department, or the same party organ) were more likely to become high starters. Princelings, officials with Communist Youth League experience, and those who are connected to the Party General Secretary were also slightly more likely to be frequent movers than the rest of the sample.  

Individuals who worked in the party apparatus and the central government in their early careers were more likely to be high starters and frequent movers. Meanwhile, officials who started from relatively low positions in the PLA or the local government were more likely to spend most of their early to mid-careers in their original career domains.

Career tracks and political success 

Connections with Xi matter much more after 19th Party Congress, but do not entirely outweigh career tracks. The impact of being connected to the Party General Secretary became much larger in the 2017 19th Party Congress, when Xi Jinping appointed several of his closest allies to positions of power. For those with connections to Xi, the probability of becoming a Central Committee member, Politburo member, and Politburo Standing Committee member all increased by significant margins. The occasional mover career track was still significantly and positively correlated with political success, though the advantages of being a high starter or frequent mover disappeared altogether. Notably, former leaders of the Communist Youth League no longer receive any advantage in promotions; if anything, the correlation becomes negative. 

The researchers conclude that access to the highest ranks of power within the CCP increasingly depends on personalistic ties rather than a rules-based order.